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I. INTRODUCTION
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
or
"Hague Convention"
Abduction [hereinafter
Child
1
"Convention"] is an important legal mechanism for effectuating
the return of a child internationally abducted by a parent or person
alleging custodial rights. As international parental abductions

escalate due to an increase in international travel, a rise in the
number of marriages between residents of different countries, and a
growth in the international divorce rate, 2 it has become increasingly
Ms. Vullo is a Senior Court Attorney with the New York State Supreme
Court, Queens County. She graduated from Cornell University with a B.A. in
Government and History, received a Masters degree in Public Administration
from New York University, and a J.D. from Pace University School of Law.
** Mr. Standora is the Principal Secretary to Judge Judy Harris Kluger,
Administrative Judge of the Criminal Court of the City of New York. He
graduated from Columbia University with a B.A. in History and received a
Masters degree in American History from Northwestern University.
1 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction,
Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 1, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 98, reprinted in
51 Fed. Reg. 10493 (1986) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
2 See Cara L. Finan, Comment, Convention on the Rights of the Child: A
Potentially Effective Remedy in Cases of International Child Abduction, 34
SANTA CLARA L. Ry. 1007, 1008 (1994) (commenting that the rise in
international child abduction is attributed to bi-national marriages with
*
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important for parents, legal practitioners, and the judiciary in the
United States to become familiar with the Hague Convention and
the relief it provides. 3 This article intends to clarify the purpose of
the Hague Convention and to offer guidance on petitioning the
courts of New York for the return of a child abducted from a
foreign nation and taken to New York. It also discusses the role of
the Convention in securing the exercise of a noncustodial parent's
visitation rights in New York and abroad. This article will not
focus upon children who are abducted from New York and taken to
a foreign nation, because in those cases, return petitions are to be
adjudicated in the foreign nation and not in the courts of the United
States .4

religious and cultural differences, international travel, and children with dual
citizenship and two passports); Lawrence H. Stutter, The Light at the End of
the Tunnel: The Hague Convention on International Child Abduction has
Reached Capitol Hill, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 285, 300 (1986)

(commenting that the increase in travel and international marriages have added
a new dimension to child abduction); U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical
Abstract of the United States 265, 266 (1996) (reporting a steady increase in
international travel to and from the United States from 1970 to 1994); 1994
Demographic Yearbook, Dep't for Economic and Social Information and
Policy Analysis 559 United Nations, New York (1996) (finding that the
international divorce rate has risen on the average since 1990).
3 Office of Children's Affairs, Overseas Citizens Services, Bureau of
Consular Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, Office of Children's Issue Statistics1994 at 1 (1994) [hereinafter Office of Children's Issues Statistics]. According
to the United States State Department, 762 Hague cases were filed in the
United States in 1994. Id. Of these cases, 426 (or 57%) involved children
abducted from the United States and 310 (or 43%) involved children abducted
to the United States. Id. Mothers were the abductors i- 63% of the cases and
fathers were the abductors in 37% of the cases. Id.
4 See infra note 35 and accompanying text. For a thorough guide on
domestic parental abductions and international parental abductions from the
United States, see Patricia M. Hoff, Parental Kidnapping: Prevention and
Remedies, The Parental Abduction Training and Dissemination Project, 1994
A.B.A.

CENTER ON CHILDREN AND LAW

(revised May, 1997).
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II.

INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION

THLE BACKGROUND AND
HAGUE CONVENTION

20.1

PURPOSE OF THE

The Hague Convention was convened October 25, 1980 in the

Hague, Netherlands. 5 Its purpose is to provide for the prompt
return of a child who was wrongfully removed to or retained in a
country that is a signatory to the Convention [hereinafter
"signatory"], by a person who intends to obtain physical or legal
custody of that child abroad. 6 It also aims to ensure that rights of
custody and access to a child under the laws of one signatory are
respected in other signatories. 7
These purposes are to be
accomplished by returning the child to the parent or custodian

[hereinafter "petitioner"] with whom the child was residing prior to
the abduction, 8 regardless of the existence of a custody or visitation
decree

obtained

by

the

abducting

parent

[hereinafter

"respondent"] .9
The Hague Convention was not devised to settle the merits of
custody disputes between parties in different signatories or to award
custody and visitation based upon the child's best interest. 10 It was
5 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. VI, art. 45, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
16, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 105; see id. T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at I (stating that the
treaty was entered into force on December 1, 1983 and the United States
became a signatory on July 1, 1988).
6 Id.
ch. I, art. 1(a), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 98.
7 Id. ch. I, art. 1(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 4, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 98; see
id. ch. I, art. 5(a)-(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 99
(defining custody and access). See also Hague International Child Abduction
Convention, Legal Analysis by the Department of State, 51 Fed. Reg. 10493,
10513 (1986) [hereinafter Legal Analysis] (noting that the term 'access' refers
to visitation rights).
8 Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1064 (6th Cir. 1996); Feder v.
Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1995); Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d
369, 372 (8th Cir. 1995).
9 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 17, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101.
10 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 16, 19, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101; Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1063; Brooke v.
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designed to determine where a child should be physically located,
so that the courts of the country where the child normally resides
can make the proper custody determinations. 1 1 Nonetheless, as
will be later discussed, the Convention gives the judiciary such
broad discretion in determining whether to return a child to the
petitioner that, in practice, the courts tread a delicate line between
delving into the merits of a custody dispute and simply determining
what is in the child's immediate physical and psychological
interest. 12
The Hague Convention was also not devised to compel the
administrative or judicial authorities of the signatory to which the
child was abducted [hereinafter "abducted-to signatory"] to
recognize and enforce judgments and orders issued by the child's
home country, or "habitual residence." 13 Occasionally, petitions
are filed in the New York courts for a writ of habeas corpus
compelling a respondent in a foreign signatory to return an
abducted child to New York. The courts of the abducted-to
signatory, however, are under no obligation to recognize and
enforce a writ of habeas corpus or any other New York judgments
or orders. Whether they will accord recognition is, in the absence
of an international instrument or laws in that signatory permitting
such recognition, a matter of international comity. 14

Willis, 907 F. Supp. 57, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Currier v. Currier, 845 F.
Supp. 916, 920 (D.N.H. 1994); In re David B. v. Helen 0., 625 N.Y.S.2d
436, 437 (Fam.Ct. N.Y. County 1995).
11 Currier, 845 F. Supp. at 920; In re David B., 625 N.Y.S.2d at 437;
Loos v. Manuel, 651 A.2d 1077, 1079 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994).

12 See infra notes 115 - 156 and accompanying text (discussing the exercise
of judicial discretion).
13 See infra notes 73 - 113 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning
of "habitual residence").
14 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). "[The] principle of

'comity' is that courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and
judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation
but out of deference and mutual respect." 1d. See also Societe Nationale
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for Southern Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 519, 544 n. 27 (1987) ("Comity refers to the spirit of cooperation in
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The Hague Convention is also not an extradition treaty. It does
not criminalize the wrongful removal of a child or interference with
the visitation of a child; it provides a civil procedural remedy. 15 It
is solely concerned with the return of the child to the petitioner, not
whether the respondent returns and faces punishment for his or her
actions. 16 Therefore, in the absence of an extradition treaty, an
abducted-to signatory need not recognize another signatory's
criminalization of a child's abduction and extradite the
respondent. 17
To date, forty-six countries have either ratified or acceded to the
Convention. 18 In order to be bound by the Convention, a signatory

which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws
and interests of other sovereign states.").
15 Legal Analysis, supra note 7, at 10505.
16 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 12, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 7-8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100 ("[Ihe authority concerned shall order
the return of the child forthwith."). (There is no provision for the return of
the wrongdoer, which is the purpose of a criminal extradition).
17 Congress enacted the International Parental Kidnapping Act of 1993,
[hereinafter IPKA] which criminalizes abductions from the United States and
seeks the return of the abductor. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204 (Supp. 1996). It
applies, however, only to children abducted from the United States, not to
children abducted to the United States, and applies only where there are
existing extradition treaties between the countries concerned. Id. See infra
notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
18 Only nations that have ratified the Convention become signatories. See
Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. VI, art. 37-38, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
13-14, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 104. Those who accede are obligated to observe
the Convention only with respect to the countries that accept the accession. Id.
ch. VI, art. 38, T.I.A.S. 11,670, at 14, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 104. As of April
1997, the following countries are parties to the Convention: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Bosnia-Heregovina, Burkina Faso,
Canada, Chile, Columbia, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark (except Faroe Islands
and Greenland), Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, St. Kitts and Nevis,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain,
Northern Ireland, United States, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. List obtained

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1997], Art. 7

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

must enact a domestic law that adopts the treaty and provides for its

execution. 19 The International Child Abduction Remedies Act of
1988 [hereinafter "ICARA"] 20 is the enabling legislation passed in
the United States to establish procedures for executing the

Convention and to empower the courts of the United States with the
authority to adjudicate Convention petitions. 2 1 ICARA sets forth

notice and hearing requirements, delineates the burdens of proof
that must be established by the parties involved, requires federal
and state courts to accord full faith and credit to the judgments of

other courts ordering or denying a child's return, and authorizes the
use of interagency and governmental resources to locate an
22
abducted child.

Any nonabducting "person, institution, or other body" that has
exercised or would have exercised custody rights may employ the

Convention and ICARA to effectuate the return of an abducted
child only if he or she chooses. 23 The existence of the Convention

and ICARA do not preclude a petitioner from invoking any other
applicable law in a judicial or administrative forum in the United
States

and bypassing

the Hague

Convention

and ICARA

altogether. 24 The Convention and ICARA also do not preclude the
from U.S. Central Authority, Office of Children's Issues, U.S. Dep't of State,
Room 4811, Washington, D.C. 20520.
19 See generally David McClean, The Hague Child Abduction Convention The Common Law Response,
40 NETHERLANDS L. REv. 67 (1993);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 cmt.h (1986).
20 The International Child Abduction Remedies Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 11601-11610 (1995) [hereinafter ICARA].
21 Id. §§ 11603, 11604.
22 Id. §§ 11603(c),(e),(g), 11606(d), 11608.
23 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 8, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 6-7, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100; 22 C.F.R. § 94.5 (1097). See ICARA, 42
U.S.C.A. § 11602(1) (stating that the petitioner must file an application to
invoke the Convention's protection).
24 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 18, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101 (stating that the Convention does not preclude a
judicial or administrative authority from ordering the return of a child at
anytime), ch. V, art. 29, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 12, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 103
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use of any other international instrument in effect between the

signatories involved. 25 However, when a petitioner invokes the
Hague Convention and ICARA, their provisions supersede those of
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act [hereinafter
26
"UCCJA"] in matters of international child abduction.

The

UCCJA is a model domestic act that has been adopted by the
individual states to deal with conflicting interstate jurisdiction over
child custody matters. 27 Although the Convention and ICARA take
precedence over the UCCJA, 28 provisions of the UCCJA relating
to the recognition of foreign custody decrees, notice, and the
opportunity to be heard are relied upon to carry out the
Convention's mandates, as will later be discussed.
The Hague Convention and ICARA do not conflict with two
federal statutes enacted to address parental kidnappings, the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 [hereinafter
"PKPA"]29 and the International Parental Kidnapping Act of 1993

(stating that a petitioner is not precluded from seeking the return of a child
under laws other than the Convention); ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(h).
25 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 34, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 13, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 103; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(h) (stating that
"[t]he remedies established by the Convention and this chapter shall be in
addition to remedies available under other laws or international agreements.").
26 Duquette v. Tahan, 600 A.2d 472, 477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991); Frost v. Frost, No. FD-16-3525-91 (N.J. Super. Ct., Feb. 11, 1991).
See ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(d) (stating that the petitions brought before
the courts under the Convention are to be decided according to the
Convention).
27 Codified in New York under N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §§ 75-a - 75-z
(McKinney 1988) [hereinafter DRL]. The UCCJA may be extended to the
international are not through DRL § 75-w.
28 The Hague Convention and ICARA take precedence over the UCCJA
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art VI, cl. 2 ("[The Laws of the United States ... and all Treaties
made ... under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law
of the Land .... ).
29 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A
(1994) [hereinafter PKPA]. See also Crimes and Criminal Procedure Act, 18
U.S.C.A. § 1073 (Supp. 1996) (stating that flight to avoid prosecution or give

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1997], Art. 7

206

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

[hereinafter "IPKA"]. 30 The PKPA was enacted to deal only with
abductions within the United States and concerns the enforcement
of custody decrees in one state that were previously granted by a
court in another state. 3 1 Since it does not require courts to give
"full faith and credit" to foreign custody decrees, it is not a feasible
option for an aggrieved parent whose child has been internationally
abducted to or from the United States. 32 The IPKA, which makes
international parental abductions from the United States a federal
crime, was intended to complement the Convention by providing
that the United States may request extradition of a parent who
abducted a child from the United States. 33 It does not, however,
criminalize parental abductions to the United States. While the
IPKA may encourage the United States to be more aggressive in
pursuing international parental abductions of children from its own
soil, the statute is limited because it applies only to countries that
have extradition treaties with the United States. 34 Furthermore, it
represents United States legislation, not international law.
Therefore, foreign countries need not observe the legislation's
directives.

testimony in cases such as domestic and international abductions from the
United States constitutes a criminal act).
30 IPKA, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1204.
31 PKPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a).

32 Id. "The appropriate authorities of every state shall enforce according
to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this
section, any child custody determinations made consistently with the provisions
of this section by a court of another state." Id.
33 IPKA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1204(a),(d).
34 See EXTRADITION TREATY, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3111, 165

LNTS 45. This treaty lists the following countries as parties: Chile, Columbia,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama and the United States. Id.
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PROCEEDING UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION
AND ICARA
Where to File a Return Petition

The administrative or judicial authorities of the abducted-to

signatory determines whether a child will be returned to his or her
habitual residence. 35 Therefore, petitions for the return of a child
abducted from New York must be initiated in the abducted-to
signatory, not in New York, and petitions for the return of a child
abducted to New York must be initiated in the courts of New York.
There are several ways to initiate a return proceeding under the
Hague Convention. Regardless of the procedure chosen, a petition
should be filed promptly to prevent the respondent from
35 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 12-15, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 7-9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100-01 (indicating that the judicial or
administrative authorities of the abducted-to signatory determine whether a
child is to be returned); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1063 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding "[c]ourt in abducted-to nation has jurisdiction to decide merits
of an abduction claim ... ."); Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 (3d
Cir. 1995) ("Any person seeking the return of a child under the Convention
may commence a civil action ... where the child is located.'); Rein v. Rein,
1996 WL 273993, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 1996) (finding that the United
States did not have subject matter jurisdiction over return petition commenced
pursuant to the Hague Convention because the child was abducted to England,
therefore any claim must be brought there); But see Roszkowski v.
Roszkowska, 644 A.2d 1150 (N.J. Super. Ch. Div. 1993); See aLso Aubry v.
Aubry, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 31 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County). In
Roszkowski, the court ordered the respondent to return the child to New Jersey
from Poland. Roszkowsld, 644 A.2d at 1160. However, the court failed to
recognize that, pursuant to the Convention, Poland should have been the
jurisdiction determining whether the child should be returned to the United
States. The Polish authorities do not hve to recognize a New Jersey court
order directing respondent to retrieve the child. In Aubry. the petitioner was
granted temporary custody of a child located in Switzerland. Aubry, N.Y.
L.J., Sept. 16, 1991, at 31. The respondent, who was also in Switzerland,
was ordered by a New York court to return the child to the United States. Id.
Switzerland, however, is under no obligation under the Convention to
recognize and enforce a New York order.
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adjudicating custody issues on the merits in the abducted-to
signatory, and to prevent the child from "settling" into his or her
new environment, which may minimize the opportunity for the
36
child's return.

First, the petitioner may apply directly to the "Central Authority"
located in the abducted-to signatory. 37 Every signatory to the
Convention is required to establish a Central Authority to
"discharge the duties which are imposed by the Convention .. .
,"38 The Office of Children's Issues in the Bureau of Consular
Affairs in the Department of State is the designated Central

36 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 12, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 7-8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100 (mandating that the child shall be
returned in a proceeding commenced after one year unless "it is demonstrated
that the child is now settled in its new environment"). See discussion infra
notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
37 Id. ch. III, art. 8, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 6-7, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100;
ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11602(1).
38 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. II, art. 6, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
5, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 99. These duties include processing Convention
applications, locating a child wrongfully removed or retained, preventing
further harm or prejudice to the child by taking precautionary measures such
as contacting the signatory's welfare agency to take action consistent with its
abuse and neglect laws, and securing the voluntary return of the child.
Furthermore, the Central Authorities are required to release the child's social
background information, provide general information on the law of the
signatory in connection to the petition, facilitate administrative or judicial
proceedings concerning the child's safe return, provide legal aid and advice
when required, keep the Central Authorities in other signatories updated with
respect to the Convention, and eliminate obstacles to the application of the
Convention. Id. ch. II, art. 7, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5-6, 22514 U.N.T.S. at
99, ch. III, art. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 7, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100;
ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. at § 11608(a)-(c); 22 C.F.R. §§ 94.3, 94.6, 94.7
(1997). See ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11608(a)-(c) (stating that in order to
locate abducted children, the United States Central Authority may use the field
and tracking resources of government agencies and departments such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Attorney
General, and U.S. Department of Education), §§ 11606(d), 11608(d) (noting
that the Central Authority is also authorized to use the Parent Locator Service
established under the Public Health and Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 653
(1991)).
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Authority in the United States. 39 A petitioner from a signatory
who seeks the return of a child abducted to or retained in the United
States may contact that office to begin the return process. 40 It
should be noted that the U.S. Central Authority provides
administrative assistance only. It "[i]s prohibited from acting as an
agent or attorney or in any fiduciary capacity in legal proceedings
arising under the Convention.,, 4 1 It is also not responsible for the
cost of legal representation, legal proceedings, or transportation
expenses of the petitioner or child. 42 Therefore, although a petition
may be initiated in the U.S. Central Authority, the petitioner still
must seek his or her own legal counsel in the United States and bear
the cost of a legal proceeding. Nonetheless, the Central Authority,
with its vast resources and expertise, provides the invaluable
service of locating the child in a manner that may not be possible
for the petitioner.
The petitioner may also apply to the Central Authority located in
the child's habitual residence, and that Central Authority will refer
the petition to the Central Authority located in the abducted-to
signatory. 43 Thus, for a child taken to New York from a foreign
signatory, a petition may be initiated with the Central Authority
located in the foreign signatory and that Authority will refer the
petition to the U.S. Central Authority for processing. For a child
abducted from New York, a petition may be initiated with the U.S.
Central Authority, which will forward the petition to the Central
Authority located in abducted-to signatory, transmit pertinent
information, and monitor the situation. 44
Finally, the petitioner may appeal directly to the courts of the
abducted-to signatory to compel the return of the child to his or her

39 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11606; 22 C.F.R. § 94.2 (1997).
40 22 C.F.R. § 94.6 (1997).
41 22 C.F.R. § 94.4 (1997).
42 Id.
43 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 8-9, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 6-7, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11602(1).
44 22 C.F.R. § 94.7 (1997).
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habitual residence. 45 Articles 11 to 20 of the Hague Convention
authorize the judicial and administrative authorities of the
signatories to determine the rights of a petitioner and child under
the Convention. 46 ICARA authorizes the courts of the United
States to adjudicate petitions and take whatever measures are
necessary under state and federal law to protect the child pending
disposition of the petition. 47 In matters where a child has been
wrongfully removed to or retained in the United States, a petitioner
may bypass the U.S. Central Authority and apply directly to the

federal district courts or the state courts. 4 8 Applying to the Central
Authority or the courts is not mutually exclusive. A petitioner may
apply to one or both simultaneously. 49

B.

The Elements of a Hague Convention Return Petition

Besides providing the information required by the Hague

Convention 50 and the Central Authorities, 5 1 a return petition must
45 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 29, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 12, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 103; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(b).
46 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 11-20, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 7-9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100-01.
47 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A §§ 11603(a), 11604(a). ICARA does not authorize
administrative agencies in the United States to adjudicate Hague petitions.
48 See ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A § 11603(a)-(b) (giving authority to commence
civil action in courts). In New York, a petition may be filed in either Federal
District Court, Family Court, or the New York State Supreme Court. The
Family Court and New York State Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction
over custody issues. See N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act §§ 651, 652 (McKinney 1983).
See also Mahmoud v. Mahmoud, 1997 WL 43524, at * 1 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 24,
1997) (holding that the Convention does not prohibit a respondent from
moving a Hague proceeding from state court to federal court under the federal
removal statute).
49 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 11, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 7, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100; 22 C.F.R. §§ 94.6(i), 94./(b). Petitions are to
be decided within six weeks, otherwise the petitioner or the Central Authority
has the right to request a statement from the court explaining the reason for the
delay.
50 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 8(a)-(g), T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 6-7, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100.
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satisfy several conditions prior to fully invoking the authority of the
Convention. First, the child's habitual residence and the abductedto signatory must be parties to the Convention in order for them to
be bound by its mandates. 52 Many countries have refused to sign
the Convention based upon the belief that it would be in the best

interest of the child to decide long-term custody issues in their own
jurisdiction. 53 Nonsignatories may acquiesce to the Convention if
they file a document of accession with the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs in the Netherlands, but the accession is valid only against
the signatories that accept the accession. 54 The Convention takes
effect in a country only after that country signs and ratifies the

51 22 C.F.R. § 94.5. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 27,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 11, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 103 (stating that Central
Authorities do not have to accept petitions that do not fulfill the Convention's
requirements); see also Id. ch. V, art. 24; 22 C.F.R. § 94.5 (stating that the
petitions initiated in the U.S. Central Authority must be in the form proscribed
by the Central Authority and submitted in duplicate in English or with English
translations, and petitions intended for use in a foreign country must have two
additional copies in that country's foreign language); Hague Convention, supra
note 1, ch. V, art. 30, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 12, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 103;
ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11605 (holding that authentication of petition,
accompanying documents, or information is not required in order to be
admissible in court).
52 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 35, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 13, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 103; see Mezo v. Elmergawi, 855 F. Supp. 59, 6263 (E.D.N.Y.), affid 22 F.3d 1091 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the Hague
petition dismissed because the countries to which the children were abducted,
Libya and Egypt, were not signatories to the Convention); In re Moshen v.
Moshen, 715 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (D.Wyo. 1989) (wherein the petition was
dismissed because the abducted-to country, Bahrain, was not a signatory to the
Convention); Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 672 A.2d 1226, 1232 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1996) (holding that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain a return
petition because Morocco was not a signatory to the Convention).
53 See Dorothy Carol Daiole, Note, Due Process Rights of Parents and
Children in International Child Abductions: An Examination of the Hague
Convention and Its Exceptions, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 865, 870 (1993).
54 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. VI, art. 38, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 14, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 104.
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Convention, not from the date the Convention was originally
55

convened.
Second, the petition must be commenced within one year of the
date of the wrongful removal or retention in order for the courts of
an abducted-to signatory to direct the return of the child. 5 6 If the

petition is made after one year, the court still must order the child
returned to the petitioner (assuming all the other Convention
conditions are met) unless it can be shown that the child has settled

into a new environment. 57 Obviously, a problem arises when a
child cannot be located within one year of the abduction, subjecting
the petitioner to this discretionary exception which may delay or

prevent the child's return. The child must also be under the age of
sixteen. 58 However, the Convention does not bar the use of other
laws or procedures to effectuate the return of a child who is over
the age of sixteen. 59
Third, the petitioner must establish that the country the child was
abducted from is the child's habitual residence. 6o The courts of the
habitual residence will determine the custody claim that underlies

55 Id. ch. V, art. 35, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 14, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 103,
art. 43, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 at 15, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 105. See Koons v.
Koons, 161 Misc.2d 842, 615 N.Y.S.2d 563 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1994) (holding that Hague Convention could not be applied because child was
abducted from Italy one month before Italy became a signatory).
56 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 12, T.I.A.S No. 11,670, at
7-8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100; see Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 841 F. Supp. 264,
270 (N.D. Iowa 1993) (holding that the one year period commences from the
date the noncustodial parent asserts rights of custody).
57 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 7-8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100.
58 Id. ch. I, art. 4, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 99; 22
C.F.R. § 94.1(c).
59 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 18, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101, ch. V, art. 29, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 12,
22514 U.N.T.S. at 103, ch. V, art. 34, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 13, 22514
U.N.T.S. at 103. These articles clearly indicate that the Convention is not the
exclusive remedy to be utilized in international abduction cases.
60 Id. ch. I, art. 4, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 99.
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the abduction. 6 1 As will be discussed in the following section,
establishing the child's habitual residence is the cornerstone of a

successful return petition.
Finally, the petitioner must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the child was wrongfully removed from the habitual
residence or wrongfully retained in the respondent's country. 62 A
removal or retention is wrongful under Article 3 of the Convention
if it breaches the custody rights of a person or institution as defined
by the laws of the child's habitual residence, and that at the time of
the removal or retention, those rights were being exercised or
would have been exercised but for the removal or retention. 63
Custody rights (held jointly or alone) may be established by either a
legally binding agreement between the parties, by operation of the
law of the child's habitual residence, or a custody decree. 64 Thus,
unlike other treaties or domestic laws concerning child abduction, 65
61 Legal Analysis, supra note 7, at 1050; Currier v. Currier, 845 F. Supp.
916, 920 (D.N.H. 1994); Tyska v. Tyska, 503 N.W.2d 726, 728 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993).
62 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. I, art. 3, T.I.A.S No. 11,670, at 45, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 98-99; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603 (e)(1)(A).
63 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. I, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at
4-5, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 98-99; Brooke v. Willis, 907 F. Supp. 57, 61-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1995). See Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1066. For cases on the exercise
of custody rights, see Currier,845 F. Supp. at 921 (holding that the petitioner
had the right of custody at time of children's removal pursuant to order issued
by German court); Meredith v. Meredith, 759 F. Supp. 1432, 1435-36 (D.
Ariz. 1991) (holding that the petitioner did not have legal custody at time of
child's removal because she acquiesced to Arizona custody decree awarding
respondent custody of child); Loos v. Manuel, 651 A.2d 1077, 1083 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1994) (finding that under German law, foster parents were
not exercising rights of custody at the time the natural mother removed child
from Germany to New Jersey).
64 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. I, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670. at
4-5, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 98-99; Brooke, 907 F. Supp. at 61.
65 See The European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of
Decisions Concerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of
Children, May 20, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 273 (concerning the recognition and
enforcement of child custody decrees issued by states that are parties to this
Convention); PKPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(a), (b)(3) (stating full faith and
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a custody decree from the child's habitual residence is not
required.

66

Prior to issuing an order for the return of the child, the courts of
the abducted-to signatory may request an "Article 15"
determination. Under Article 15 of the Convention, the courts may
request that the petitioner "obtain from the authorities of the State
of the habitual residence of the child a decision or other
determination that the removal or retention was wrongful within the
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention ... ,"67 In other words,

the courts may request a determination establishing that the
petitioner had custody rights at the time of the abduction pursuant to
the laws of the child's habitual residence, and that these rights were
breached by the abduction or retention. Thus, the New York courts
may request an Article 15 determination from the courts of the

child's habitual residence when adjudicating a return petition.
Similarly, a petitioner whose child was removed from New York

and taken to a foreign signatory may motion the New York courts
68
for a determination of "wrongfulness" under the Convention.
Since a finding of custody rights is required for an Article 15
determination, a problem arises in countries that do not permit such
credit is to be accorded to child custody determinations); Missing Children's
Assistance Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5772(1)(A) (1995) (defining a
.missing child" as one removed from legal custodian without consent); DRL §
75-c(2) (finding that "custody determination" means court decisions and court
orders providing for temporary or permanent custody of a child, including
visitation rights).
66 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(f)(2). In the United States, a custody case
is created for the purposes of the Hague Convention when any parent or
custodian requests assistance from the U.S. Central Authority in an
international custody dispute. In accordance with the Convention, a custodial
decree or warrant is not necessary for the U.S. Central Authority to become
involved. Office of Children's Issues Statistics, supra note 3, at 1.
67 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 15, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 8-9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101; see ICARA 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(0(1)
(defining the term "authorities" as used in Article 15 as referring to the
appropriate court or agency of the child's habitual residence).
68 See 22 C.F.R. § 94.7(d) ("[The Central Authority shall] upon request,
facilitate efforts to obtain ...

a statement as to the wrongfulness of the taking

of the child under the laws of the child's state of habitual residence.").
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custody determinations to be made in the absence of the child and
respondent. This situation would not be a problem where a child
was abducted to New York. Nor would it be a problem where a
child was abducted from New York because New York's UCCIA
permits custody adjudications on the merits in the child's absence,
as long as one of its jurisdictional prerequisites are met and
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard is afforded to the
respondent. 69 Thus, a New York court may issue a custody
determination to the petitioner without the child being present. The
custody determination, however, should contain an explicit finding
of wrongful removal within the meaning of Article 3 of the
Convention in order to satisfy the requirements of Article 15.
Another problem that arises under Article 15 is the length of time
it may take to obtain a determination from either a New York or
foreign court, which could significantly protract the disposition of a
return petition. To expedite the return process, a New York court
disposing of a return petition may forego an Article 15 request and
take judicial notice of the laws of the child's habitual residence to
determine whether a wrongful removal or retention has occurred. 70
Likewise, the courts of an abducted-to signatory disposing of a
return petition may forego an Article 15 request and take judicial
notice of New York State laws.
It must be emphasized that Article 3 requires only a showing that
the petitioner had a right of custody or access at the time the child
69 DRL §§ 75-d(1),(3), 75-e. There is also New York authority holding that
ex parte temporary custody orders are permitted under extraordinary
circumstances. See Klam v. Klam, 797 F. Supp. 202, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(holding that an ex parte temporary custody application will be entertained by
the courts upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances); Alberts v. Alberts,
168 A.D.2d 1004, 564 N.Y.S.2d 945 (4th Dep't 1990) (holding an ex parte
temporary custody order can be made only upon a showing of extraordinary
circumstances).
70 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 14, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101; see In re David S. v. Zamira S., 151 Misc.2d
630, 634, 574 N.Y.S.2d 429, 432 (Faro. Ct. Kings County 1991) (wherein the
court took judicial notice of custody, access, and guardianship laws of Ontario,
Canada and recognized Canadian decree giving petitioner temporary custody
of children).
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was removed or retained. 7 1 It does not require the court to delve
into the merits of the custody arrangement that existed at the time of
72
the abduction or to modify custody rights post-abduction.
Therefore, consideration of "wrongfulness" for the purposes of an
Article 15 determination should be limited to the custody
arrangement that existed immediately preceding the abduction.
Consideration of the merits of a custodial arrangement postabduction only undermines the goal of the Hague Convention to
restore the factual custody status quo. The merits of a custody
situation should be decided once the child is returned to his or her
habitual residence and a hearing can be held with all the relevant
parties present.
C.

Habitual Residence: The Key to A Child's Return

Since the Convention was predicated upon the goal of returning
internationally abducted children to the location where they
normally reside, the most important fact a petitioner must establish
is that the signatory from which the child was abducted is the
child's habitual residence. It is the habitual residence that has the
right, under the Convention, to determine any underlying custody
disputes between the petitioner and the respondent. 73 Although the
term "habitual residence" is not defined by the Hague Convention
or ICARA, a definition has emerged from the New York courts.
Habitual residence was initially defined in New York in In re
Cohen v. Cohen.74 Cohen defined habitual residence in terms of
the concept of "domicile," which centers on the intent of a person
to reside in a particular place. 75 Applying this concept, the court
71 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 3, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at

4, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101.
72 Id.
73 Legal Analysis, supra note 7, at 10507.
74 158 Misc.2d 1018, 602 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1993).
75 Id. at 1024, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 998. Cohen involved two young children
with dual citizenship of both the United States of America and the State of
Israel. Id. at 1020, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 995. The parents were married in
Israel, and moved to Cleveland, Ohio, where their children were born. Id.
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found that there was no intent on the part of the respondent to
relocate her children to Israel, only a consent to the children
visiting the petitioner in Israel. Thus, the court refused to order the

children returned to Israel from the United States, finding that the
parents intended the United States to be the children's habitual

residence.
The Cohen approach, however, failed to recognize the difference
between the concepts of domicile and residence.

Residence

requires only a bodily presence in a particular location, whereas
domicile requires an intent to make that location one's fixed and
permanent home. 76 Since a child's domicile is determined by the
parent's domicile and intent, 77 there is a dilemma if the parent
The children were reared in Ohio by both parents, and after marital
difficulties, by respondent alone in New York City until 1992, where an
attempted reconciliation was made between petitioner and respondent. Id. In
late Fall 1992, petitioner purchased one-way tickets to Israel for himself and
the children. Id. Respondent maintained regular telephone contact with the
children in Israel, while simultaneously seeking relief in the New York Courts
for a determination of custody. Id. at 1020, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 996.
Respondent went to Israel and with the assistance of the United States
Embassy, obtained new passports for the children and took them back to the
United States. Id. at 1021, 602 N.Y.S.2d at 996. Once back in New York,
the respondent applied for an order of protection against the petitioner through
the Family Court of Kings County. Id. That application was stayed, and the
Hague proceeding resulted. Id.
76 BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1308-09 (6th ed. 1990). The terms
"residence" and "domicile" are compared and distinguished as follows:
Residence means living in a particular locality, but domicile means
living in that locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent
home. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in
a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile.
Id. See 49 NY Jur. 2d § 2 at 7-8 (1985) ("Residence can be determined by
physical fact alone, but domicil depends on intent, because 'residence' means
simply living in a particular locality, but 'domicil' means living in that locality
with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home.").
77 See 25 Am. Jur. 2d Domicil § 41 (1996) ("A minor's domicil is the
same as that of the minor's parents."). See also Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983
F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that "habitual residence" should not
be confused with domicile which focuses on the parent, not the child); Rosario
v. INS, 962 F.2d 220, 224 (2d Cir. 1992) ("A minor's domicile is the same as
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keeps a domicile in one location but resides with the child on a
regular basis in another location. Thus, under Cohen, a child may
be returned to a jurisdiction where he or she has spent little or no
time because the parent intended to make that jurisdiction their
domicile. This undermines the purpose of the Convention, which is
to avoid uprooting a child and subjecting him or her to custodial
determinations in a jurisdiction where the child has no meaningful
ties .78
Furthermore, the Cohen approach contravened the intent of the
drafters of the Convention, who specifically rejected the concept of
"domicile" to avoid the application of a rigid and technical criteria
to determine a child's habitual residence. The intent was for the
concept of habitual residence to be flexible in light of the facts of a
specific case, the various judicial systems involved, and the social
79
and cultural differences of the signatories.
The courts began to move away from the concept of domicile and
towards the concept of residence in the case of In re GabriellaM. 80
In Gabriella M., the Family Court held that a child's customary
residence prior to his or her removal or retention, rather than
that of its parents, since most children are presumed not legally capable of
forming the requisite intent to establish their own domicile.").
78 See supra notes 6 - 17 and accompanying text. Despite the difference
between the concepts of "domicile" and "residence," some courts have held
that parental intent is a factor in determining a child's habitual residence. See
In re Ponath, 829 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Utah 1993) ("[Ihe desires and
actions of the parents cannot be ignored by the court in making [a]
determination [where] the child was at the time of the removal or retention
."); Harsacky v. Harsacky, 930 S.W.2d 410, 414 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996)
("[W]hen considering a parent's complaint that a child has been abducted and
wrongfully removed to a jurisdiction, the Court must ask whether the parent
intended or agreed that the jurisdiction would be home to the child, if only for
an indefinite period.").
79 Explanatory Report by E. Perez-Vera, Hague Conference on Private
International Law, Acts and Documents of the 14th Session 53 (1982) (ed.
Permanent Bureau of the Hague Convention on Private International Law)
[hereinafter Perez-Vera Report]. See Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp.
662, 666 (D. Kan. 1993) (determining that the drafters' intent was "for the
concept to remain fluid and fact based, without becoming rigid. ").
80 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 16, 1993, at 26 (Fam. Ct. Kings County).
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United States citizenship or parental intent, was controlling in
determining a child's habitual residence. 8 1 The court returned a
four year old child to Hungary where the child, a Hungarian and
United States citizen, lived most of his life prior to his retention in
the United States.8 The child's parents, both of whom had lived
and worked in Budapest, had raised the child under joint custody
until his retention by the respondent. 83 The child's two month visit
with the respondent's parents in the United States prior to his

retention was merely a vacation and did not change the child's
residence. 84
New York has since abandoned the "domicile" approach in favor
of defining habitual residence in terms of a "settled purpose." 85
This analysis, which had been developing in other federal and state
jurisdictions, 86 appears to have been first applied in In re David B.
v. Helen 0.,87 where the Family Court held that there must be a

81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See In re David B. v. Helen 0., infra note 87 and accompanying text.
86 See Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217,224 (3d Cir. 1975); Rydder v.
Rydder, 49 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir. 1995); Friedrich v, Friedrich, 983 F.2d
1396, 1400-01 (6th Cir. 1993); Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 841 F. Supp. 264,
268-69 (N.D. Iowa 1993); Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp. 662, 666 (D.
Kansas 1993); Falls v. Downie, 871 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Mass. 1994);
Schroeder v. Vigil-Escalera Perez, 664 N.E.2d 627, 632-33 (Ohio Com. Pl.
1995). Later cases include Brooke v. Willis, 907 F. Supp. 57, 61 (S.D.N.Y.
1995); Walton v. Walton, 925 F. Supp. 453, 456-57 (S.D. Miss. 1996). The
"settled purpose" analysis was adopted from the British case In re Bates, [Feb.
23, 1989] No. CA 122/89 (High Ct. of Justice, Farn. Div'l Ct., Royal Ct. of
Justice, United Kingdom, which held that "[a]ll that is necessary is that the
purpose of living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be
properly described as settled" (quoting R v. Bamel London Borough Council
ex parte Shah, [1983] 2 A.C. 309. 314).
87 In re David B. v. Helen 0., 625 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Fain. Ct. N.Y. County
1995).
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suitable degree of continuity in the child's living arrangements in
order for the court to consider the child "settled" in that country. 88
In David B., the father, a British national, petitioned for the
return of his children to England. 89 The mother, a British and
Nigerian national, was living with the children in the New York
City shelter system. 90 The court found that the United States was
not the children's habitual residence because they were not settled
here. 9 1 They were found to be habitual residents of Nigeria, not
England, because the majority of their time and education was spent
in Nigeria, their possessions and relatives were in Nigeria, and the
father had supported the mother and children's application for a
Nigerian residency permit. 92 These facts exhibited a continuity of
living in Nigeria, whereas the moves to England and the United
States were considered brief and did not establish fixed
residences.93
In Brennan v. Cibault,94 the Appellate Division, Fourth
Department, defined settled purpose as "evidenced by the child's
circumstances in that place and the shared intentions of the parents
regarding their child's presence there ... [t]he focus is on the child
rather than the parents, and on past experience rather than future
intentions." 95 In Brennan, France was determined to be the child's
habitual residence. 96 The child, who was over two years old at the
time of the proceedings, was born and raised in France for the first
sixteen months of her life. 97 Her parents were married in France
and had established a home and professions there. The child came
88 Id.at 440.
89 Id. at 437.
90 Id. at 440.
91 Id.
92
Id.at 441.
93 Id.

94 227 A.D.2d 965, 643 N.Y.S.2d 780 (4th Dep't 1996).
95 Id. at 966, 643 N.Y.S.2d at 782.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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to the United States only for a six-week visit with her grandmother.
The court found that "[these] facts reflect a settled purpose on the
part of the parties to establish [the child's] life in France." 98
In Cassie M.D. v. Othmar D.,99 the past experiences and overt

acts of the parents demonstrated a purpose to settle in the United
States, not Austria. In this matter, the petitioner, a United States
citizen, had come to the United States from Austria. 100 Her
husband, the respondent, arrived later with the child. 10 1 The
parties had subletted their apartment in Austria, sold their car and
furniture in Austria, settled outstanding debts, and applied for a visa
for the respondent, who secured permanent employment in
Pennsylvania.1 0 2
Furthermore, the petitioner's witnesses
established that the respondent was making arrangements to
permanently reside in the United States. 103 Therefore, the Family
Court declined to order the child returned to Austria with the
respondent because the conduct, overtly stated intentions, and
agreements of the parties during the period preceding the alleged
retention indicated that the United States was the child's habitual
residence. 104

Finally, in Brooke v. Willis, 10 5 the federal district court held that
the period of time a child spends in a particular location does not
determine the existence of a settled purpose. 1 06 In Brooke, the
98 Id.
99 N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 1996, at 32 (Faro. Ct. New York County).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.

104 Id.
105 907 F. Supp. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
106 Id. at 61. In Brooke, petitioner was a British citizen living in England
and respondent was a naturalized citizen of the United States. Id. at 58. A
child custody order provided for joint legal and physical custody of child
where the child would spend fifty percent of her time with each parent. Id.
According to the order, the petitioner delivered the child from England to the
respondent then living in the United States. Id. at 59. When the respondent
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court defined settled purpose as "determined more by a state of
being than by any specific period of time; technically, habitual
residence can be established after only one day as long as there is
some evidence the child has become 'settled' into the location in
question., ' 10 7 In this case, England was declared the child's
habitual residence at the time she was abducted, because although
she had spent only one summer there, "she was well accustomed to
her surroundings." 108 The child enjoyed living in England with the
petitioner's parents, visiting with her relatives, and engaging in
activities that indicated she was settled there. 109
As these cases demonstrate, the New York courts will determine
a child's habitual residence by where the child physically resides on
a continuous basis and whether this location is the center of the
child's daily existence immediately prior to the abduction or
retention. 110 The courts will consider the child's education, family
relations, activities, health, and family employment to determine
whether a child's presence in a particular country can be
characterized as habitual or "settled." 111 Only the actual recent
history of the child's living pattern and the parent's overt actions
prior to the child's abduction or retention, not the parent's future
intentions, will be considered. 112 Therefore, a return petition
should allege facts that sufficiently establish a continuity and history
of living in the signatory to which the petitioner seeks the child's
return. If the facts do not demonstrate a "settled purpose," the

failed to return the child at the end of her custody period, the petitioner filed

an action under the Convention. Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Id. In Brooke, the respondent failed to appear, thus the court's
determination was based solely upon the petitioner's presentation of the facts.

Id. at 62.
110 See supra notes 86-109 and accompanying text.
111 Id.
112 Id.
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courts have no basis for ordering the child's return under the
Convention.113

C.

The Exercise of Judicial Discretion in Adjudicating a
Return Petition

The Hague Convention imposes upon the courts of an abducted-to
signatory several restrictions on the exercise of their judicial
discretion. The first and most significant restriction is that the
courts may not consider the merits of any custody issue underlying
an abduction. 1 14 The second restriction is that they may not issue a
custody determination once they have received notice of the child's
retention or removal. 115 A third restriction is that the courts may
not refuse to order the return of an abducted child based solely
upon a custody order from their own courts or the courts of another
country. 116 Thus, a respondent cannot exclude a child from the
Convention's protection simply because that respondent obtained a
custody order in the abducted-to signatory.
Other than these restrictions, the courts may order the return of a
child at anytime under laws other than the Convention, such as
other treaties, agreements, procedures, or the principles of
international comity. 117

They may also consider the reasons

underlying an existing custody decree when adjudicating a

113 Id.

114 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 16, 19, T.I.A.S.
No.11,670, at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S.

11601(b)(4).

at 101;

ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A.

§

See Tyska v. Tyska, 503 N.W.2d 726, 728 (Mich. Ct. App.

1993) (vacating the trial court's custody determination because it was rendered

after the trial court determined that the child was wrongfully retained in the
United States from France under Article 3 of the Convention).
115 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 16, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,

at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101.
1 16

Id. ch. III, art. 17, T.I.A.S. No. at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101.
117 Id. ch. III, art. 18, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101;
ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(h).
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petition. 118 Furthermore, and most importantly, the courts may

deny a child's return, at its discretion, pursuant to several
exceptions set forth by the Convention. 119
Under these exceptions, a return petition may be denied if it was
not commenced within the one year statute of limitations and if it is
shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child has
settled into his or her new environment. 120 A petition may also be
denied where it can be shown, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the person, institution or other body having care of the child
was either not exercising custody rights at the time of removal or
retention, or had acquiesced or consented to the removal or
retention. 121 Furthermore, it may be denied where the facts

demonstrate, once again by a preponderance of the evidence, that
the child has attained an age and degree of maturity and objects to

being returned. 122 Finally, a petition may be denied where it is
shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that there is a grave risk
118 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 17, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101.
119 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(a)(4).
120 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 12, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 7-8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(B); see In
re Petition for Coffield, 644 N.E.2d 662, 666 (Ohio App. 1994) (determining
that five year old was not considered settled in his new environment of ten
months because he had a limited group of friends and there was no evidence
that he was enrolled in school or involved in other activities); In re David S. v.
Zamira S., 151 Misc.2d 630, 574 N.Y.S.2d 429, 433 (Fam. Ct. Kings
County 1991) (finding that children aged three, and one and one half, who
were not shown to have attended school, religious services or instruction, or to
have formed meaningful relationships, were not "settled" in a new
environment).
121 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 13(a), T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(B);
see Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d 1060, 1070 (6th Cir. 1996)
("[A]cquiesence under the Convention requires either: an act or statement with
the requisite formality, such as testimony in a judicial proceeding; a
convincing written renunciation of rights; or a consistent attitude of
acquiescence over a significant period of time.").
122 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(B).
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that returning the child would expose him or her to psychological or
physical harm or an otherwise intolerable situation, 123 or that
returning the child would violate the fundamental human rights and
"fundamental freedoms" of the abducted-to signatory. 124
Although Articles 16 and 19 of the Hague Convention state that
decisions rendered under the Convention are not to be made upon
or construed by others as a decision on the merits of a custody
issue, many of the exceptions to returning a child to his or her
habitual residence bestows upon the judiciary such broad discretion
that what is meant to be a summary proceeding can become an
evidentiary hearing on the merits of the underlying custody
issues. 125 Terms such as "intolerable situation," "grave risk,"
"settled in a new environment," and the threshold level of "physical
or psychological harm," are not defined by the Convention.
Ascertaining their meaning necessitates an examination of the
child's familial and social environment, such as the parental
qualities of the child's parents or caretakers, and the nature and
quality of the parents' and child's lifestyles. Notwithstanding that
the Convention permits consideration of the child's social
background as provided by the Central Authorities or other
competent authorities, 126 it may be difficult to distinguish between

evidence pertaining to the child's immediate situation if returned
and evidence pertaining to parental fitness. The latter inquiry relates
to the child's best interest and is usually reserved for a custody
proceeding on the merits.
The Convention also does not offer any guidance in evaluating a
child's preference to remain in the abducted-to signatory in light of
This determination involves
the child's age and maturity.
subjective judgment, even where courts use "objective"
123 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 13(b), T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(A).

124 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. Ill, art. 20, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(2)(A).
125 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 16-19, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 9, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101.

126 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 13, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101.
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psychological reports. These reports usually examine familial
relationships, life experiences, and complex psychological issues,
which, once again, bear upon the merits of a custodial arrangement.
A child's wishes are best left to a custody proceeding where a child
can be represented, removed from the possibility of parental
influence, and have his or her wishes examined in the context of his
or her overall best interest. 127
Furthermore, the exceptions present a risk of imposing value
judgments upon the political, social, cultural, and legal environment
of the child's habitual residence. Cultural distinctions disguised as
familial situations may be introduced into the proceedings.
Determining what constitutes a "grave risk" or whether a situation
meets the fundamental human rights exception entails consideration
of the impact of a signatory's cultural, legal, and political practices
on the child. Occasions may arise where returning a child conflicts
with our country's fundamental beliefs. For example, should our
courts return a child to a country where due process will not be
applied to the child and his or her parents as interpreted by our
federal constitution? The risk of using the exceptions as a pretext
for cultural bias is further exacerbated by the fact that the courts
have the choice of applying its own law or the law of the child's
habitual residence. 128 The law that is chosen may depend upon
the outcome the court wants to achieve, which may reflect a social
or cultural bias.
There is no significant body of case law in New York applying
the various exceptions to returning a child or discussing the exercise
of judicial discretion under the Convention. In one of two cases
concerning a child's preference to remain in the United States,
Sheikh v. Cahill,129 the court found that, based upon an in camera
127 For a full discussion on the child objection exception, see Rania Nanee,
Note, The Views of a Child: Emerging Interpretation and Significance of the
Child's Objection Defense Under the Hague Child Abduction Convention, 22
437 (1996).
128 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. III, art. 14, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 8, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 101.
129 145 Misc.2d 171, 177, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517, 521 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1989).
BROOK. J. INT'L L.
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interview, a nine year old boy's preference to remain in the United
States was the product of his father's influence during his wrongful
retention. 130 The court did not discuss the application of the
exception or articulate the standard it applied in evaluating the
child's preference. In the other case, Daniel H. v. Catherine Ann
O.H.,131 the court found that, based upon an in camera interview
and the testimony of a licensed psychologist, the parties' ten year
old son was sufficiently mature and capable of forming a preference
to remain in the United States. 132 The court found that his seven
year old brother, however, lacked the maturity to make the same
determination. 133 Since the court was convinced that the ten year
old's love for his younger brother was stronger than his desire to
remain in the United States, and since there were no overwhelming
circumstances to justify the brothers' separation, they were both
returned to Cyprus. 134 While the court set forth its factual reasons

for not applying the preference exception, it did not discuss its
approach to evaluating the child's preference or the type of
135
psychological evidence allowed in the psychologist's testimony.
The New York courts have also failed to discuss the scope of
judicial discretion when applying the grave risk/intolerable
situation. In DanielH., the respondent's claim that political turmoil
in Cyprus would pose a grave risk of physical or psychological
harm to her children was refuted by testimony of the Consul
General of Cyprus on the country's political stability. 13 6 The court
noted that Monroe County, the New York community where the
respondent sought to raise her children was, according to local
newspapers, undergoing an epidemic of youth violence. 137 Thus,

130 Id. at 177, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 522.
131 N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17 1996, at 32 (Faro. Ct. Monroe County).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17 1996, at 32 (Farn. Ct. Monroe County).
137 Id.
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the children's safety could not be guaranteed in the United States or
Cyprus.
In the matter of In re GabriellaM.,138 the court dismissed the
respondent's claim that Hungary posed a grave risk to the retained
child because there was no evidence offered in support of the
respondent's contentions. 139 Finally, in Sheikh, the court found no
evidence in the court papers or in an in camera interview with the
child supporting the respondent's contention that returning the child
to the United Kingdom would pose a grave risk or intolerable
situation. 140 In these three cases, the courts merely decided on the
facts without defining the exception or identifying the factors they
considered in determining whether the exception applied.
The court in in re David S. v. Zamira S. ,141 came closest to
defining an exception. In David S., the court considered the
"settled in a new environment" exception and determined that a
three year old son and a one and half year old daughter were not
settled in Brooklyn because there was no evidence that the children
established "meaningful ties" to the community. 142 They were too
young to participate in school and religious and social activities,
and had not yet formed meaningful friendships. 143 The court
ordered them returned to Ontario, Canada where the children's
relatives lived, friends of both parents resided, and the respondent
maintained an apartment. The respondent's search for a new
husband in Brooklyn did not satisfy the exception. 144
Despite the lack of authority in New York on the scope of
judicial discretion in applying the Convention's exceptions, there is
a general consensus in the United States that the exceptions should
138 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 16, 1993, at 26 (Farn. Ct. Kings County).
139 Id.

140 Sheikh v. Cahill, 145 Misc.2d 171, 177, 546 N.Y.S.2d 517, 521 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1989).
141 In re David S. v. Zamira S., 151 Misc.2d 630, 574 N.Y.S.2d 429
(Fain. Ct. Kings County 1991).
142 Id. at 636, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 636-37, 574 N.Y.S.2d at 433-34.
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be narrowly construed. 145
Nonetheless, what constitutes a
"narrow" construction has not been comprehensively defined,
leaving the door open for the judiciary to subjectively assess the
personal and parental qualities of the parties and evaluate the
political, cultural, and social elements of the signatories involved.

The application of the grave risk/intolerable situation exception in
two cases illustrates this dilemma. On the one hand, the Appeals
Division of the New Jersey Superior Court in Tahan v. Duquette146
affirmed a lower court's ruling that the ultimate personal and

parental qualities of the parties should not be considered in
determining whether a threat to a child's physical and psychological
well-being exists if the child is returned. 14 7 Consideration should

be limited only to whether the child's surroundings and the "basic
personal qualities of those located there" would pose a grave risk or

create an intolerable situation. 148 The Appeals Division stated that
145 See ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11601(a)(4) (refers to the exceptions as
"narrow"); Wanniger v. Wanniger, 850 F. Supp. 78, 81 (D. Mass. 1994)
(stating that the exceptions are to be constructed "very narrowly ...[e]ven if
one of the exceptions is found applicable, the court is not required to refuse a
return order"); Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp. 662, 667 (D.Kan. 1993)
("All of the exceptions which allow courts to deny the return of children under
the Convention are intended to be construed and applied very narrowly to
effectuate the objectives of the convention.").
146 613 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
147 Id.at 489-90.
148 Id. at 489. The Tahan court conducted an "Article 13b inquiry" which
focuses exclusively upon jurisdictional issues and not individuals. The court
stated that:
[An] Article 13b inquiry was not intended to deal with issues or
factual questions which are appropriate for consideration in a
plenary custody proceeding.
Psychological profiles, detailed
evaluations of parental fitness, evidence concerning lifestyle and the
nature and quality of relationships all bear upon the ultimate issue.
The Convention reserves these considerations to the appropriate
tribunal in the place of the habitual residence . .. No court on a

petition for return should intrude upon a foreign tribunal's subject
matter jurisdiction by addressing such issues.
Id. at 489. See Nunez-Escudero v. Tice-Menley, 58 F.3d 374, 378 (8th Cir.
1995) (remanding the case to lower court for a determination on the
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while Article 13(b) requires the courts to recognize more than the
civil stability of a child's habitual residence, the court should

evaluate the child's surroundings and social background without
examining complex, psychological issues or overall parental
fitness. 14 9

The Connecticut Superior Court in Renovales v. Roosa, 150 on the
other hand, admitted evidence on the parties' psychological
profiles, parenting styles, nature of the children's relationship with
the parties, and the familial structure to evaluate the anticipated
effects of returning the children to Spain. 15 1 This type of evidence
related to the merits of the custodial arrangement. The court found
that while both parents "love[d] the children deeply," the

petitioner's strict method of raising the children, which was
attributed, in part, to cultural differences, did not pose a grave risk
or intolerable situation for the children and ordered them to be
application of the Article 13b with instructions to not consider evidence that
bears upon the custody or best interest of the child).
149 Tahan, 613 A.2d at 489. The Tahan court stated that
[I]t is clear that Article 13b requires more than a cursory evaluation
of the home jurisdiction's civil stability

. .

. [if that were all that

were required, the drafters of the Convention could have found a
clear more direct way of saying so

. .

. To hold

. . .

that the proper

scope of inquiry precludes any focus on the people involved is, in
our view, too narrow and mechanical. Without engaging in an
exploration of psychological make-ups, ultimate determinations of
parenting qualities, or the impact of life experiences, a court in the
petitioned jurisdiction, in order to determine whether a realistic
basis exists for apprehensions concerning the child's physical safety
or mental well-being, must be empowered to evaluate the
surroundings to which the child is to be sent and the basic personal
qualities of those located there.
Id. See also Currier v. Currier, 845 F.Supp 916, 923 (D.N.H. 1994) (The
court, noting that the focus of the Article 13(b) exception is limited to the
grave risk, if any, that situation seriously presents for the children," did not
find allegations of the respondent's depression or estranged relationship with
her parents relevant to whether the child should be returned absent evidence
that these conditions put the child in danger).
150 1991 WL 204483, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 1991).
151 Id. at *4-5.
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returned to Spain.152 The court remarked that the respondent, who
was seriously ill, had to face the consequences of choosing to love,
marry, and bear children in Spain and could not "rip their children
out of the country of their residence." 153 The court passed further

judgment on the "wonderful and unique cultures" of Spain and the
United States, commenting that "neither exclusively offer[ed] more
or greater guarantees of success in child upbringing."154 Instead of
considering whether the children would face immediate danger or
an intolerable situation if returned to Spain, the court, in actuality,
conducted an evidentiary inquiry into the merits of the signatories
and the parties' parental fitness.
To avoid consideration of the child's long-term best interests and
the social mores of the signatories involved, a "narrow"
construction of the exceptions should include limiting psychological
evidence to the immediate psychological and emotional impact of
returning a child to his or her habitual residence. Psychological
evidence should also be limited to assessing the child's level of
maturity to express a preference (such as choosing to live in the
abducted-to signatory) and whether this preference is valid in light
of the child's demonstrated ties to his or her "new" surroundings.
A narrow construction should also be limited to considering only
the basic qualities of the parties, whether the child would be subject
to abuse or neglect if returned, and the signatory's current state of
affairs such as war, disease, famine, or natural disaster. When
evaluating whether the child has established meaningful ties to the
abducted-to signatory, the court should focus on what the child's
relationships and activities mean to the child in light of the child's
age and maturity, not whether the court believes the relationships
would be good for the child.
The court should also not focus on which parent is "right or
wrong," and should refrain from debating the relative cultural,
social, and legal merits of the signatories involved. Futhermore,
the court should presume that the courts of foreign signatories are
152 Id. at *5.
153 Id. at *6.
154 Id.
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just as concerned as the courts of the United States with the safety
and well-being of a child who is the subject of a custody dispute,
and have confidence that the custody dispute will be appropriately
resolved. 155 Finally, the court should be mindful that even if an
exception applies, it is still within the court's discretion to return
the child to his or her habitual residence if the return is in
accordance with the intent of the Convention. 156 Overall, the goal
in exercising judicial discretion should be to prevent a decision that
would have an uncertain effect on the child in the event the parties'
circumstances change, to reduce the trauma of uprooting the child,
and to reserve the underlying custody issues for the courts of the
child's habitual residence. 157
IV.

SECURING ACCESS TO A CHILD: VISITATION
PETITIONS

In addition to effectuating the return of an internationally
abducted child to a custodial parent or person, the Hague
Convention attempts to protect the visitation rights of noncustodial
parents. 158 The visitation provision of the Hague Convention,
Article 21, is more discretionary than mandatory, requiring only
that the Central Authorities "promote the peaceful enjoyment of
access rights and the fulfillment of any conditions to which the
exercise of those rights may be subject" by taking steps to remove
155 See Perez-Vera Report, supra note 79, no.34, at 426 (discussing that
the signatories, despite their differences, should presume they belong to the
same legal community); Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1068 ("[W]e acknowledge that
courts in the abducted-from country are as ready and able as we are to protect
children. If return to a country, or to the custody of a parent in that country,
is dangerous, we can expect that country's courts to respond accordingly.").
156 Legal Analysis, supra note 7 at 10509; Friedrich v. Friedrich, 78 F.3d
1060, 1067 (6th Cir. 1996); Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F. Supp. 662, 667 (D.
Kan. 1993).
157 Id. at 1068.
158 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. I, art. 1(b), T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 4, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 98, ch. I, art. 5b, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 5, 22514
U.N.T.S. at 99, ch. IV, art. 21, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 10, 22514 U.N.T.S.
at 102; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11601(a)(4), 11602(7).
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"all obstacles to the exercise of such rights." 159 There are no
provisions mandating the "return" of a child to the noncustodial
parent's signatory for the purposes of visitation. There are also no
guidelines on how the Central Authorities are to go about securing
the exercise of visitation rights, except that they may initiate or
assist in the commencement of an Article 21 proceeding to secure
the exercise of visitation rights under the Convention. 160
Therefore, it is ultimately at the discretion of the courts as to how
visitation-rights will be exercised by a noncustodial parent.
An Article 21 petition should be filed with the administrative or
judicial authorities of the child's habitual residence in the same
manner as a return petition, except the grounds would differ and the
relief requested would be access to the child, rather than the child's
return. 16 1 A petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that he or she has a right of access. 162 In New York, a
noncustodial parent may secure visitation rights through either a
court decree or an agreement with the custodial parent having legal
effect. 163 Thus, a noncustodial parent seeking visitation with his or
her child abroad pursuant to a New York decree may commence an
Article 21 proceeding in the child's habitual residence. Similarly, a
noncustodial parent with a visitation decree from abroad who seeks
access to his or her child located in New York may commence an
Article 21 proceeding in the New York courts to determine how
visitation rights are to be exercised. 164
159 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. IV, art. 21, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 10, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(e)(1)(B).

163 DRL § 240(1); see DRL § 240(3) ("An agreement by the parties made
before or during the marriage, shall be valid and enforceable .. .Such an

agreement may include.. .provision for the custody, care, ... of any child
of the parties."); DRL § 236(B)(3)(2) ("The court may make an order of
protection... to permit a parent to visit the child at stated periods.").
164 Recognition of a foreign visitation decree in New York may also be
accomplished through the UCCJA pursuant to DRL § 75-w which extends the
Domestic Relations Law to the international realm. DRL § 75-w. However,
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Article 21 may not be used to compel the transport of a
child to the noncustodial parent's signatory for visitation purposes.
This interpretation of the scope of Article 21 was first articulated by
the Massachusetts Supreme Court in Wragh v. Foldes,165 the first
reported case in the United States to address a visitation petition. In
Viragh, a noncustodial parent residing in Hungary sought to enforce
a Hungarian visitation decree in Massachusetts by having his child
"returned" to Hungary for visitation. 166 The court, in denying his
request, held that a noncustodial parent who is denied access to his
or her child by the custodial parent may not use an Article 21
proceeding to have the child "returned" within the meaning of
Article 3 for the purposes of visitation, 167 because "the Convention
does not mandate any specific remedy when a noncustodial parent
has established interference with rights of access." 168 The court
did suggest, however, that a child may be returned at the court's
discretion under Article 18 of the Convention, which states that the
Convention does not prohibit the courts from ordering the child
returned at any time under provisions other than the Convention. 169
Article 21 may also not be used in a proceeding in the
noncustodial's signatory to evade the administrative or judicial
authority of the child's habitual residence to determine visitation
issues. 170 Furthermore, it may not be used by a noncustodial
parent during a child's visit to obtain, from the noncustodial's
signatory, modification of the visitation conditions established prior

since the international travel of the child may be involved, it may be wise to
also pursue visitation rights through the Convention to ensure the involvement
of the Central Authorities.
165 612 N.E.2d 241, 247 (Mass. 1993).
166 Id. at 243-46.
167 Id. at 247; see also Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 672 A.2d 1226, 1232 (N.J. Super.

Ct. App. Div. 1996) ("[The Convention does not mandate the return of
children to the noncustodial parent for the purpose of visitation.") (citing
Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241, 246 (Mass. 1993)).
168 Viragh, 612 N.E.2d at 247.
169Id. at 247 n. 10.

170 Legal Analysis, supra note 7,at 10514.
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to the child's visit. 17 1

Modifications are to be made by the

administrative or judicial authorities of the child's habitual
residence. 17 2

A custodial parent may invoke Article 21 to secure the Central
Authority's assistance in ensuring the child's return at the
expiration of the visitation period.173 The custodial parent can
request from the courts, with the Central Authority's help, that

conditions be imposed upon the noncustodial parent such as a
performance bond, temporary suspension of the noncustodial
parent's passport, 17 4 or supervised visitation. The custodial parent

may also file a return petition alleging wrongful retention under
Article 3 if the child is not returned when the visitation period
expires. 17 5

The Convention does not address visitation by persons other than
the noncustodial parent, such as stepparents, grandparents, siblings,
and other relatives, although New York permits grandparent
visitation.176 It also does not offer assistance to those financially
171 Id.
172 I.
173 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. IV, art. 21, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 10, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102. The custodial parent may want to
obtain an order directing the respondent to seek a reciprocal visitation order
from the courts of the respondent's signatory recognizing the jurisdiction of the
child's habitual residence and agreeing to order the child returned in the event
of a retention.
17 4 See Klien
v. Klien, 141 Misc.2d 174, 181, 33 N.Y.S.2d 211, 215 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1988) (ordering respondent to surrender children's passports
to petitioner).
175 See In re Brennan v. Cibault, 227 A.D.2d 965, 966-67, 643 N.Y.S.2d
780, 782 (4 th Dep't 1996) (finding that an American father wrongfully
retained child who was visiting from France); In re Gabriella M., N.Y. L.J.,
Dec. 16, 1993, at 26 (Fain. Ct. Kings County) (finding that a child in United
States on vacation from Hungary wrongfully retained by father); Sheikh v.
Cahill, 145 Misc.2d 171, 174, 546 N.Y.S.2d 520, 522 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1989) (ordering the child returned to the United Kingdom under the mother's
care after the father wrongfully retained the child in the United States
following a one month visitation as ordered by English courts).
176 See DRL § 240(1).
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unable to exercise their rights of access.
In Viragh, the
noncustodial parent from Hungary claimed on appeal that he could
not afford to visit his child, who resided in Massachusetts. 177
Although the case was remanded to the trial court for a hearing on
the financial issues, there was no indication as to what the courts
should do when confronted with impoverished parents. Since the
cost of living may differ among signatories, finances may pose a
barrier to exercising visitation rights abroad.
The Convention does permit the award of necessary expenses to
the noncustodial parent by the custodial parent. 178 However,
Viragh held that attorney fees are not to be awarded in Article 21
proceedings, only in return proceedings commenced under Article
3.179 This ruling will be further explored in the section addressing
costs associated with Convention proceedings.
To date, Viragh remains the only case in the United States to
address a visitation petition. The only other case to touch upon
access rights, Ivaldi v. Ivaldi, 180 merely affirmed that the
Convention does not mandate the return of a child where the
petitioner only had a right of access. 18 1 There are currently no
reported cases in New York concerning an Article 21 proceeding.
V.

NOTICE AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

The Hague Convention is silent on providing notice and an
opportunity to be heard to the respondent. Thus, it is up to the
individual signatories to determine how service upon a respondent
is to be made and whether any type of hearing will be afforded. In
the United States, ICARA mandates that notice "shall be given in
accordance with the applicable law governing notice in interstate
177 Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241, 249 (Mass. 1993).
178 Id. See also Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 26, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,670, at 11, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102.
179 Viragh, 612 N.E.2d at 250.
180 672 A.2d 1226 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
181 Id. at 1232. The primary issue in Ivaldi was whether the court could
entertain a return petition involving a nonsignatory. Id. at 1230-31.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss1/7

38

Vullo: International Child Abduction

1997

INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION

237

child custody proceedings." 182 It also mandates that a child shall
not be returned to his or her habitual residence unless the applicable
18 3
requirements of state law are satisfied.

The applicable law in New York governing notice in interstate
child custody proceedings is the UCCJA. 184 The UCCJA requires
reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard afforded to parents

in New York State whose parental rights have not been previously
terminated, and to anyone else in New York State who has physical

custody of the child. 185 It also requires notice to persons located
outside New York State to be reasonably calculated to give notice
by either personal service, return receipt, or in such a manner as
directed by the courts. 186 Where the person to be served is outside
the United States, the UCCIA, which is an interstate statute, does

not apply. 187 Nor would ICARA, which does not address foreign
service and only refers to interstate statutes regarding domestic
custody disputes. 188 Foreign service upon a person outside the
182 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(c).
183 Id. at § 11604(b).
184 DRL§ 75-b.
185 DRL § 75-e; see Brooke v. Willis, 907 F. Supp. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y.
1995) (determining that reasonable notice was given where Hague petitioner
attempted service upon respondent several times and gave respondent court
details over the phone); Green v. Green, N.Y. L.J. July 6, 1993, at 33 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County) (determining that petitioner appeared for the purposes of the
Domestic Relations Law and the Hague Convention by commencing the
original custody proceeding and having her attorney accept service of cross
motion of a Hague return petition).
186 DRL § 75-f(1)(a)-(c); see Leslie L.F. v. Constance F., 441 N.Y.S.2d
911, 917 (Fain. Ct. New York County 1981) (finding that petitioner must
inform court that person cannot be served within state so that court can direct
manner of service).
187 See Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., 129 A.D.2d 94, 98, 515
N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (4th Dep't 1987) ("The Hague Convention has the status
of a self-executing treaty and constitutes the supreme law of the land under
Article VI of the United States Constitution

. .

. [t]hus [the Service Abroad

Treaty] takes precedence over state law.").
188 See ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(c) (referring only to following the
law that governs notice in interstate custody proceedings).
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United States is governed by the Hague Convention on the Service
Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or
Commercial Matters [hereinafter "Service Abroad Treaty"] where
there is no agent of that person in the United States and if the
country in question is a signatory to this treaty. 189 Under the
Service Abroad Treaty, the summons and/or complaint are to be
forwarded to the Central Authority located in the signatory of the
person to be served and that Authority will effectuate service
according to the signatory's civil procedure laws. 190
The issue of service upon a person outside of the United States in
a Hague child abduction proceeding would most likely arise where
an Article 15 determination has been requested from our courts by
either the courts of an abducted-to signatory or the petitioner acting
upon his or her own initiative. In that situation, notice that an
Article 15 proceeding has been commenced in New York would
have to be served upon a respondent located outside the United
States in the abducted-to signatory.
Since, however, service
pursuant to the Service Abroad Treaty may prolong the
determination of a return petition, the petitioner should ask the
signatory where the respondent is located to expedite matters by
recognizing service upon the respondent, provided that the

189 Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial

Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, 20 U.S.T. 361, (1969), reprinted
in

Fed.

R.

Civ.

4

[hereinafter

the

Service

Abroad

Treaty];

see

Volkswagenwerk v Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988) (noting that if service can
only be made in Europe, the Hague Convention must be fully complied with).

Many cases in New York have affirmed that service upon a person outside the
United States must be effectuated pursuant to the Service Abroad Treaty. See
Wood v. Wood, 213 A.D.2d 713, 647 N.Y.S.2d 830 (2d Dep't 1996);
Vasquez v. Sund Emba AB, 152 A.D.2d 389, 392-93, 548 N.Y.S.2d 728,
729-30 (2d Dep't 1989); Rissew v. Yamaha Motor Co., 129 Misc.2d 94, 98,
515 N.Y.S.2d 352, 354 (4th Dep't 1987); Low v. Bayerische Motoren Werke,
88 A.D.2d 504, 505, 449 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (1st Dep't 1982); Zwerling v.
Zwerling, 167 Misc.2d 782, 785, 636 N.Y.S.2d 595, 598 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1995).

190 Service Abroad Treaty, see supra note 189, ch. I, art. 5.
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signatory did not object to the method of service used when it
ratified the treaty. 19 1
As for return petitions adjudicated in New York, once notice is
provided to the respondent to appear with the child in the United
States via writ of habeas corpus, 192 a hearing on the return
application is to be held. 193 The child's name should be entered in
94
all applicable state and federal registries as a missing person.1 If
191 See Service Abroad Treaty, supra note 189, art. 10(a) (permitting the
forwarding of judicial documents directly to the person abroad provided the
country of designation did not object to this method of service when it ratified
the treaty); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 313 (McKinney 1990) (Practice
Commentary C313:2 at 428) ("If the 'Central Authority' is not used, and
service is made under the CPLR, the service will be valid only if the signatory
nation recognizes the service"); See also Wood, 213 A.D.2d at 713-14, 647
N.Y.S.2d at 830-31 (finding that service for the divorce action was defective
because Germany filed an objection to Article 10 when it ratified the treaty).
192 The expediency contemplated by the Hague Convention and ICARA
may be at odds with state and federal rules of civil procedure, which impose
time frames that may prevent the prompt disposition of a Hague petition. For
example, the Hague Convention and ICARA regulations state that a petition
should be decided within six weeks. See Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch.
III, art. 11, T.I.A.S. No.11,670, at 7, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 100; 22 C.F.R. §§
94.6(i), 94.7(b). State and federal rules of civil procedure however, proscribe
time frames that may extend a proceeding beyond six weeks. See FED. R. Crv.
P. 12(a)(1)(A) (twenty days to answer a petition); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R.
3012 (twenty to thirty days to answer depending on manner of service); FED.
R. Civ. P. 30 - 34; and Article 31 of N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.& R. on disclosure.
The time frames imposed by state and federal rules governing habeas corpus
applications, on the other hand, comport with the expedient decision-making
contemplated by the Hague Convention and ICARA. See FED. R Cirv. P.
81(a); Article 70 of N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L.& R.
193 The authority for a hearing derives from ICARA which prohibits a
court from removing a child from a person's physical custody without
satisfying applicable state laws. ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11604 (b). New
York's applicable statute, the UCCJA, requires an opportunity to be heard in
custody proceedings. DRL § 75-e.
194 See National Child Search Assistance Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5779
(1995) (requiring federal, state, and local law enforcement authorities to report
missing children to the National Crime Information Center of the U.S. Justice
Department; criminal charges not necessary to file a missing person report
with the National Crime Information Computer Center); Missing Children's
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the respondent fails to appear with the child, a warrant in lieu of the
writ should be issued permitting the authorities to bring the child
before the court without the respondent. If the respondent still fails

to appear, the petitioner should be granted temporary custody
pending the respondent's 'appearance.
If, once again, the
respondent fails to appear, the court should proceed to dispose of
the petition. This procedure provides the respondent with ample
opportunity to produce the child and answer the petition 195 in a

manner that is consistent with the dictates of our federal
constitution. 196
V.

COSTS

The Central Authorities and public service agencies
associated with the Hague Convention bear the costs of
implementing the Convention. 197 They may not impose upon
petitioners, related parties, or each other, any costs related to
Assistance Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5771, 5773(b) (1995) (establishing
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children); National Child
Search Assistance Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5780 (1995) (prohibiting local
authorities from imposing waiting periods and requires immediate entry of
missing child report); Missing Children Act of 1982, 28 U.S.C.A. § 534(a)
(1993) (authorizing description of missing children to be entered into the
National Crime Information Computer Center by local law enforcement and/or
the FBI). The petitioner may also ask the State Department to enter the
abducted child's name in the passport registry.
This enables the State
Department to notify the petitioner if an application for a U.S. passport has
been received anywhere in the U.S. or at any U.S. Embassy or Consulate
abroad. A petitioner may contact the U.S. Office of Passport Policy and
Advisory Services in Washington, D.C.
195 See Brooke v. Willis, 907 F. Supp. 57, 62-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
196 See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314 (1950) ("An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in
any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.").
197 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 26, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 11, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11607(a); 22 C.F.R. §
94.4(a).

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss1/7

42

Vullo: International Child Abduction

1997

INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION

petition processing, or, where applicable, to charges that have
arisen from the Central Authorities' own legal counsel or
advisers. 198 The Central Authorities may, however, require

reimbursement for expenses incurred or to be incurred in
implementing a child's return. 199 Any form of security, bond, or
deposit may not be requested by the petitioner or the Central
Authority to guarantee payment of the cost of administrative or
judicial proceedings. 20 0
As stated earlier, the U.S. Central Authority provides no legal
representation, nor does it cover court costs or transportation fees
for the child and the person accompanying the child. 20 1 Petitioners
must bear these costs unless the costs are covered by federal, state,
or local legal assistance programs. 202 The petitioner, however,

may be able to recover these costs from the respondent. If the
respondent refuses to return the child voluntarily, the courts must
levy not only the costs of legal counsel and court proceedings upon
the respondent, but transportation costs incurred in the child's
return and the costs of foster care or any other type of care
necessary for the child during the proceedings. 2 03 These costs are

to be levied unless the respondent establishes that the imposition of
198 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 26, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 11, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102.
199 Id.
200 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch.V, art. 22, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 10, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102.
201 See supra note 38 and accompanying notes.
202 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11607(b)(1)-(2); see Hague Convention, supra
note 1, ch. V, art. 26, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 11, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102,
ch. VI, art. 42, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 15, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 104 (stating
that a signatory may make a reservation that it shall not be responsible for
legal fees and the cost of court proceedings except as covered by legal aid).
203 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 26, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 11, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102; ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 11607(b)(3); see
Currier v. Currier, No. CIVIL 94-99-M, 1994 WL 392606, at *2 (D.N.H.
Jul. 29, 1994) (finding that prevailing party entitled to reimbursement of
expenses incurred in obtaining relief); Grimer v. Grimer, 1993 WL 545261, at
* 2 (D. Kan. Dec. 8, 1993) (ordering respondent to pay attorney fees, costs,
and expenses).
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these costs "would be clearly inappropriate." 204 The U.S. Central
Authority may also, on behalf of the petitioner, recoup, from the
205
respondent, its outlays in executing a child's return.

With respect to visitation petitions, the court may order the
custodial parent or person who prevented the exercise of access
rights to pay necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of a
petitioner. 2 0 6 "Necessary expenses" may include transportation
and legal costs. 2 0 7 The Massachusetts court in Viragh v. Foldes20 8

has held, however, that attorney fees may not be awarded "to a
party who successfully petitions for rights of access," but who does
not succeed in having the child returned for the purposes of

visitation under Article 18 of the Convention. 20 9 The court based
its decision upon section 11607(b)(3) of ICARA, which states that

any court ordering the return of a child pursuant to an action under
section 11603 of ICARA may order a respondent to remit necessary
expenses. 2 10 Since a child was not ordered to be "returned," the
11
court reasoned that attorney fees could not be awarded. 2
Section 11603(b), however, permits the commencement of a civil

action to secure the exercise of visitation rights, not just a child's
204 ICARA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1607(b)(3). See Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d
369, 373 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding the award of fees and legal costs to petitioner
excessive in light of respondent's financial circumstances).
205 The Central Authority may recover costs incurred in executing the
return of a child, as permitted under Article 26, although Article 28, which
empowers the Central Authority to require the petitioner to authorize it to act
on the petitioner's behalf. Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 26,
T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 11, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102, ch. V,art. 28, T.I.A.S.
No. 11,670, at 12, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 103.
206 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 26, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 11, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102 ("[T]he judicial or administrative authorities
may, where appropriate, direct the person ... who prevented the exercise of
rights of access, to pay necessary expenses . ..including . . .the costs of

legal representation of applicant and those of returning the child.").
207 Currier, 1994 WL 392606, at *1; Grimer, 1993 WL 545261, at *2.
208 612 N.E.2d 241 (Mass. 1993).
209 Id. at 250.
210 Id.
211 Id.
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return. 2 12 Furthermore, the United States did not enter any
reservations excluding the award of attorney fees in visitation
proceedings when it ratified the Convention. 2 13
The only
reservation concerning expenses refers to the U.S. Central
Authority's nonpayment of a petitioner's legal fees and court
costs. 2 14 Other than these reservations, the United States is bound
by the Convention's mandate, which permits the award of attorney
fees to petitioners who successfully invoke the exercise of visitation
rights under the Convention. 2 15
VI.

ALTERNATIVES
CONVENTION

TO

UTILIZING

THE

As discussed earlier, the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of
1980 and the International Parental Kidnapping Act of 1993 do not
212 42 U.S.C.A. § 11603(b). This section provides in pertinent part:
"Any person seeking to initiate judicial proceedings . . . may do so by
commencing a civil action .... "
213 See Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. VI, art. 42, T.I.A.S. No.
11,670, at 15, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 104 (providing signatories may enter
reservations to the Convention).
214 Hague Convention, supra note 1, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670, at 2,
Proclamation by the President of the United States, (providing that the only
reservations to the treaty are as follows: (1) "All applications, communications
and other documents sent to the U.S. Central Authority should be accompanied
by their translations into English"; and (2) "[Ihe United States declares that it
will not be bound to assume any costs or expenses resulting from the
participation of legal counsel or advisers or from court and legal proceedings
in connection with efforts to return children from the United states pursuant to
the Convention except as insofar as those costs or expenses are covered by a
legal aid program"). For a full discussion on how reservations made by
signatories have caused problems in implementing the Convention, see Susan
Mackie, Comment, ProceduralProblems in the Adjudication of International
ParentalChild Abduction Cases, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 445 (1996).
215 Hague Convention, supra note 1, ch. V, art. 26, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670,
at 11, 22514 U.N.T.S. at 102; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 321 (1986) (providing "[e]very

international agreement in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith.").

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1997

45

Touro Law Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 [1997], Art. 7

244

TOURO LAWREVIEW

[Vol 14

offer any assistance for a parent whose child was abducted from a
foreign nation and taken to New York. That parent may find relief,
however, under the UCCJA. 2 16 If a child has been abducted from
a foreign nation and taken to New York, the aggrieved parent can
attempt to enforce a foreign custody decree in the New York courts
under the UCCJA if the decree was issued by a legal institution
similar in nature to those in the United States and all interested
parties received reasonable notice and an opportunity to be
heard. 2 17 Upon enforcement, an order to return the child to the
aggrieved parent may be entered. 2 18 This option is limited,
however, because unlike the Hague Convention, it is predicated
upon a pre-existing custody decree and may be effective only in
situations where the child is abducted to the United States. In
situations where the child is taken from the United States, a custody
decree issued pursuant to the UCCJA is effective only if the
abducted-to country recognizes the decree or requests the decree in
the form of an Article 15 Hague determination. 2 19 Unlike the
Convention, which seeks only to restore actual physical custody of
the child to the non-abducting parent, the UCCJA seeks to restore
legal custody status pursuant to New York law, which other nations
need not recognize.
A more drastic alternative is re-abduction of the child from New
York to the child's habitual residence. Aggrieved parents will most
likely consider this measure when the child's habitual residence is
not a party to the Convention, an extradition treaty does not exists
between the subject countries, or an exception to returning the child
has been successfully invoked in a petition proceeding. Re216 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
217 DRL § 75-w. See Zwerling v. Zwerling, 167 Misc.2d 782, 790, 636

N.Y.S.2d 595, 601 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1995) (holding that the court
recognized Israeli custody decree on the grounds that the Israeli legal
institutions were similar to those in New York and both -arties had received
notice and an opportunity to be heard).
218 See generally DRL § 75. See also DLR § 75-b(1)(g) (listing as one of
the purposes of this section as "to facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees
of other states.").
219 See supra notes 76 - 85 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss1/7

46

Vullo: International Child Abduction

1997

INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION

245

abduction, however, would only violate the IPKA and other
applicable state and local laws, possibly resulting in criminal
prosecution. The United States can request extradition of the
abducting parent for criminal prosecution if an extradition treaty
exists between the United States and the country involved. 220 Reabduction also does not lead to any permanent resolution of the
custody situation. Abduction and re-abduction only prolongs the
child's legal and emotional state of uncertainty and further disrupts
the child's emotional, psychological, and in some cases, physical
well-being.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Hague Convention does not determine or restore a parent's
legal custody over a child that has been internationally abducted. It
restores only actual physical custody. Legal custody is to be settled
by the courts in the country of the child's habitual residence. Only
the signatory to which the child was abducted can mandate the
return of the child.
As international abductions increase and with New York
State as one of the many possible destinations for the parental
abductor and the abducted child, it is important for aggrieved
parents, legal practitioners, and the judiciary of New York State to
become more aware of the Hague Convention and the relief it
provides in obtaining either the return of one's child abducted to
New York, or access to one's child residing in New York.

220 See U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs. International
Parental Abduction 15 (1995) (stating that extradition can be achieved through
INTERPOL, an international link between law enforcement authorities in
member nations to apprehend fugitives).
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